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From Victims to Litigants
Elizabeth L. MacDowell*
This Article reports findings from an ethnographic study of self-help programs in two
western states. The study investigated how self-help assistance provided by partnerships
between courts and nongovernmental organizations implicates advocacy and access to
justice for domestic violence survivors. The primary finding is that self-help programs
may inadvertently work to curtail, rather than expand, advocacy resources.
Furthermore, problems identified with self-help service delivery and negative impacts
on advocacy systems may be explained by the structure of work within self-help
programs and the nature of partnerships to provide self-help services. The Author
uncovers previously unseen impacts of self-help programs on survivors and on the
resources to help them. She concludes with a discussion of the implications for future
research directions and describes what can be done now to improve self-help services
for survivors.
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Introduction
This Article examines how the delivery of self-help legal services is
shaped by structural factors within self-help programs, including
partnerships between courts and nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”), and the implications for advocacy on behalf of abuse
1
survivors. Protection orders are a primary legal remedy for domestic

1. For the purposes of this Article, the term self-help refers to legal services that do not involve
or result in an attorney-client relationship. Under this definition, self-help services may be provided or
supervised by attorneys or nonattorneys, and include a range of assistance such as electronic and
software-based services, and one-on-one assistance with completing and filing forms. See John M.
Greacen, Resources to Assist Self-Represented Litigants: A Fifty-State Review of the “State of
the Art” 3 (2011) (summarizing information resources provided to self-represented litigants by
courts); Self-Representation Resource Guide, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/
Access-and-Fairness/Self-Representation/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited May 29, 2016) (listing
examples of self-help resources offered by courts); see also Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice?
Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 453,
466–70 (2011) (discussing forms of unbundled legal services and limited scope representation that
overlap with self-help services as defined here).
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violence, and self-help programs often serve the most vulnerable of
3
survivors. As partnerships between courts and NGOs to provide
assistance to unrepresented litigants expand, these services for protection
4
order applicants increase as well. Yet, little is known about the efficacy
of self-help services, or their impact on advocacy-based services or
5
systemic advocacy. This Article examines data from an ethnographic
study of domestic violence self-help programs in two western states for
evidence of how self-help assistance models implicate advocacy for
survivors. In particular, it explains how preliminary findings pointing
toward specific advocacy problems may be explained by the structure of
work within self-help programs and the nature of partnerships between
NGOs and courts.
I have previously reported findings about interactions between selfhelp program staff members and litigants, analyzed through the lens of

2. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1487, 1503 n.103 (2008) (noting
that applying for a protection order is second only to calling 911); see also Susan Keilitz, Improving
Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case
Management and Technology Solutions, in Handbook Of Domestic Violence Intervention
Strategies: Policies, Programs, and Legal Remedies 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002)
(reporting survivors seek civil protection orders more often than criminal remedies); Patricia Tjaden
& Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings
from the National Violence Against Women Survey, at iii, 52 (2000) (reporting that approximately
seventeen percent of female survivors of domestic violence obtain civil protection orders each year).
3. See infra Part II (reporting data from the programs in this study); see also Admin. Office of
the Courts, Equal Access Fund: A Report to the California Legislature 54 (2005) (reporting
that a study of self-help programs provided through court-community partnerships in California found
that almost two-thirds (63%) of partnership project customers are women; at least 58% were
minorities, with Hispanic individuals comprising the largest percentage (39%)); Office of the Deputy
Chief Admin. Judge for Justice Initiatives, Self-Represented Litigants: Characteristics, Needs,
Services 1, 3–4 (2005) (reporting findings from a survey of unrepresented family court litigants in New
York City showing slightly less than half of respondents were women (45%), but 84% were minorities
(48% African American and 31% Hispanic), 39% had only a high school-level education, and 53%
earned less than $20,000 per year); John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants and Court and
Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know 3–6 (2002) (reporting studies of selfhelp service populations). For a discussion of the particular vulnerabilities of domestic violence
survivors using self-help programs, see Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the Politics of
Self-Help, 22 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 203, 207–09 (2016).
4. On the expansion of self-help services, see Judicial Council of Cal., Task Force on SelfRepresented Litigants, Statewide Action Plan for Serving Self-Represented Litigants 1 (2003)
(“Court-based staffed self-help centers, supervised by attorneys, are the optimum way for courts to
facilitate the timely and cost-effective processing of cases involving self-represented litigants, to
increase access to the courts and improve delivery of justice to the public.”). See Admin. Office of the
Courts, California Courts Self-Help Centers: Report to the California Legislature 1–2 (2007)
(reporting budget allocations for self-help programs are being increased). But see Tim Cory, California
Courts’ New Funding Formula: The Workload Allocation Funding Methodology, U.S. Common Sense
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://cacs.org/research/california-courts-wafm-assessment/ (reporting cuts to civil selfhelp services).
5. See MacDowell, supra note 3, at 226–28 (discussing the three existing studies of self-help
services in the United States).

J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

1302

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/19/2016 11:59 AM

[Vol. 67:1299

6

demeanor. Sociologists have used the concept of demeanor to analyze
how individuals including judges, clerks, and advocates exert authority in
7
interactions with abuse survivors and perpetrators. In my article
Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help, I modify and expand on
prior demeanor typologies to map the ways in which self-help staff
members regulate applicants’ conduct and shape the protection order
8
process. I show that the regulatory function of demeanor at the
programs studied here mirror stereotypes and norms that victims should
9
be passive rather than empowered self-advocates. I also show how staff
members limit relief available to survivors by excluding or refusing
assistance with some remedies, discouraging applicants from seeking
disfavored relief or from filing an application, and withholding information
and assistance selectively, depending on how they responded to individual
10
litigants.
This Article turns from documenting the operation of staff member
demeanor to identifying its organizational and structural building blocks.
The primary finding is that self-help programs may inadvertently work to
curtail, rather than expand, some advocacy resources for domestic
violence survivors in the community, even as they provide needed
11
assistance and broaden the criteria for who is eligible to receive help.
Services at the programs studied are focused on completing and
processing forms, rather than applicants’ broader needs or systemic
reform, and are not coordinated with other services to make the system
more effective. Moreover, even within their narrow service orientation,
the programs provided incomplete and problematic assistance. Additionally,
the data show that participation in self-help partnerships by NGOs can
present new challenges to empowerment-based advocacy models, which
12
focus on helping survivors meet self-defined needs. These findings both
comport with and expand on previous research showing how the
imposition of bureaucracy and hierarchy, and the alliance with institutional
13
rather than social change goals, undermines advocacy for abuse survivors.
6. Id. at 232–44.
7. James Ptacek, Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial Responses 92–
111, 133 (1999) (reporting findings of a study of judicial demeanor toward protection order applicants
and defendants); Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process: Observations
on a Court Advocacy Program, 6 Violence Against Women 606, 621 (2000) (applying Ptacek’s
typology to judges and other court personnel and advocates); see also Maureen Mileski, Courtroom
Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 Law & Soc’y Rev. 473, 521–31 (1971)
(discussing the ways in which judges use demeanor to “situationally sanction” defendants found guilty
of lessor crimes).
8. MacDowell, supra note 3, at 232–44.
9. Id. at 244–52.
10. Id. at 248–52.
11. See infra Part II (discussing findings).
12. See infra Part II (discussing findings).
13. See infra Part I (discussing studies of lay advocacy for survivors).
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The findings also demonstrate the importance of a broad approach to
studying access to justice that moves beyond individual cases and
attitudes to examine institutions and systems.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the conceptual and
theoretical frameworks informing the analysis, including the role of
demeanor in legal systems as a regulatory mechanism, and its effects on
survivors accessing the courts. It then explains the role of advocacy in
helping survivors access protection orders, and the challenges posed to
empowerment-based approaches by professionalization and collaboration
with the state. This is followed by a discussion of trends in poverty law
practice that further limit advocacy for abuse survivors. This includes
perspectives within poverty law practice that do not view family law as
amenable to structural reform goals, as well as legal aid’s turn from
structural reform to direct services and self-help. Part II describes the
current study, including relevant background information on Programs A
and B, an overview of how the programs assist applicants with the
protection order process, and the methodology used for the study. Part
III discusses the findings. This Part shows how the organization of work
within the self-help programs, and the larger organizational structures of
which they are a part, shapes the delivery of services and impacts advocacy.
Part IV then discusses implications of the findings for researchers,
reformers, and service providers. This Part provides further analysis of
the systemic impacts of the self-help programs in this study. It concludes
with suggestions for future research on the systemic impacts of self-help
interventions, and suggestions for reformers and service providers on
ways to improve self-help services now.
I. Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks
A. Demeanor in Legal Systems
Demeanor is an analytical construct that differentiates the expressive
aspect of interactions from their material function: “how” a thing is done,
14
as opposed to “what” is done. Sociologist Erving Goffman refers to the
15
first as ceremonial conduct and the second as substantive conduct.
According to Goffman, demeanor is expressed through the dimensions
of language (the words chosen for an exchange), spatial relationships
(the distance maintained between persons), and within the performance
16
of tasks. For example, a judge may grant an order in such a way as to
underscore or undermine its legitimacy. Similarly, a clerk may handle a
14. Ptacek, supra note 7, at 93–95 (relating this concept to judicial actions in protection order
hearings).
15. See Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am. Anthropologist 473,
476 (1956).
16. Id. at 477.
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phone call abruptly or solicitously. Issuing the order and answering the
phone are examples of substantive conduct, having meaning regardless of
how they are done. The manner, tone, and words used in completing the
17
acts constitute demeanor. Along with other social rules that govern
interactions, such as deference, demeanor operates at an unconscious
level most of the time, perhaps surfacing only when expectations about
18
another’s behavior are not met. Yet, the performance of these rules
helps to define and construct individuals and groups through social
interaction, and the violation of rules of conduct can lead to social
19
sanctions. The study of demeanor can lend insight into the dynamics of
power and other aspects of social relationships within institutions,
including its regulatory function within sociolegal settings.
For example, in a study of criminal court judges, Maureen Mileski
found that judges varied their demeanor according to the seriousness of
20
the crime. In interactions with defendants who were convicted of
21
serious crimes, judges usually maintained a detached and neutral affect.
However, judges issued what Mileski called “situational sanctions” (such
as reprimands in open court) to punish defendants who had committed
22
lesser crimes, disrespected staff, or disrupted the courtroom. Mileski
observed that this shift in a judge’s demeanor served a leveling function,
evening out the expression of moral indignation between defendants
receiving relatively light sentences and those convicted of crimes carrying
23
more onerous penalties.
Other studies of judicial demeanor demonstrate how demeanor can
be used to reward as well as punish. Drawing on Mileski’s work, James
Ptacek analyzed the demeanor of judges in civil protection order
hearings using a typology of five demeanor categories: good-natured,
24
bureaucratic, condescending, firm or formal, and harsh. Ptacek found
that judges most commonly treated applicants in a good-natured manner
(for example, by showing interest and concern and making sure they
understood the legal process and their options) and rarely spoke to them
25
harshly or condescendingly. In contrast, the most commonly observed
demeanor toward defendants was firm or formal demeanor, which
underscored the judge’s disapproval of the abuse and her willingness to

17. See Ptacek, supra note 7, at 93–94 (discussing a similar example).
18. See Goffman, supra note 15, at 474 (explaining that demeanor is often expressed “unthinkingly”).
19. See id. at 475 (arguing that rules of conduct should be analyzed as social action).
20. Mileski, supra note 7, at 523–26.
21. Id. at 524 (reporting that most judges behaved in a bureaucratic manner, remaining detached
and affectively neutral).
22. Id. at 523.
23. See id. at 525–26.
24. Ptacek, supra note 7, at 98.
25. Id. at 100–01, 103–04.
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sanction abusers. Conversely, judges who treated applicants with
condescension or spoke sharply to them tended to be solicitous of the
27
defendant. Because the judge’s demeanor toward each party took place
in a courtroom where both parties were present, Ptacek observes that
how judges treated abusers was a dimension of their demeanor toward
28
battered women and vice versa.
Subsequently, researcher Angela Moe Wan applied Ptacek’s typology
to analyze the demeanor of participants in the protection order process,
with similar findings for judges and for advocates helping women with
29
applications. Wan found advocates sometimes exhibited bureaucratic,
or firm or formal demeanor with clients, despite the advocates’
30
ostensibly supportive purpose. In keeping with the regulatory function of
demeanor, Wan found that advocates exhibited more negative forms of
demeanor toward applicants who were more troublesome (for example,
31
those questioning advocates’ advice).
While lacking the substantive or legal authority of judges, the
demeanor of self-help staff has particular significance for litigants due to
their location in the courthouse and their role in providing access to the
32
judge. In the present study, I modified and expanded Ptacek’s typology
to create a typology of seven demeanor categories: goodnatured/supportive, token supportive, bureaucratic, apathetic, firm or

26. Id. at 105.
27. Id. at 109. Notably, these judges were in a jurisdiction that had been subject to intensive
media scrutiny for bad judicial behavior, and thus may not be representative of judges in protection
order cases. Id. at 50–68. For studies showing problems survivors often face in family courts, see, for
example, Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task
Forces, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 1, 55–58 (1996) (summarizing results from gender bias task
force studies conducted across the United States); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender:
Sex Discrimination and the Law 241 (1989); Laura L. Crites, Wife Abuse: The Judicial Record, in
11 Women Courts and Equality 41–42 (Laura L. Crites & Winifred L. Hepperle eds., 1987) (arguing
family court judges do not understand the dynamics of domestic violence, blame women for being
victimized, and prioritize men’s privacy over women’s safety); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing
from Particularity: Perpetrators and Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. Gender, Race &
Just. 531, 539 nn.28–29 (2013) (summarizing studies of outcomes in custody and visitation cases
involving domestic violence claims); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 303, 361 (2011)
(describing victim-blaming by family court judges).
28. Ptacek, supra note 7, at 108.
29. See generally Wan, supra note 7, at 621–22 (finding that the last three demeanor categories
used by Ptacek tended to co-occur, and so combines condescending, firm or formal, and harsh
demeanor into a single category).
30. Id. at 620–21.
31. Id. at 624–25.
32. See id. at 626 (observing that bureaucratic treatment by advocates may discourage survivors
from seeking help through the court); see also Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of
Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 343, 345
(2003) (describing how survivors’ willingness to use the legal system is formed through interactions
with courts).
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formal, harsh, and patronizing/condescending.
summarized in Table 1.

33

These are briefly

Table 1: Demeanor Toward Litigant
Demeanor Types

Attributes

Good-natured/supportive

Provides emotional and material support

Token supportive

Personable but superficial

Bureaucratic

Generic, perfunctory responses

Apathetic

Seemingly personal disinterest in helping

Firm or formal

Emphasizes a superior social position

Harsh

Abrasive, intimidating, and/or punishing

Patronizing/condescending

Trivializes concerns, assumes superiority

Application and analysis of these categories demonstrated the
regulatory function of demeanor in self-help settings serving abuse
survivors. Not only was a range of demeanor present, as in Ptacek and
Wan’s studies, and sometimes appearing concurrently, as in Wan’s study,
but demeanor also shifted or evolved within the span of a single
34
interaction.
Specifically, staff members most commonly treated
applicants in a bureaucratic, routine manner that failed to address their
35
individual needs and concerns. Applicants were also sometimes treated
36
in a patronizing or condescending manner; on the other hand,
37
sometimes staff members were apathetic and simply refused to help.
However, staff members responded to applicants who self-advocated (for
instance, by persisting in seeking disfavored remedies or resisting staff
members’ advice) with increasingly more negative demeanor types, such
38
as firm or formal or (albeit infrequently) harsh demeanor. In contrast,
applicants who were more passive or compliant were treated with more
pleasant demeanors, such as good-natured/supportive or token

33. MacDowell, supra note 3, at 232–44.
34. Id. at 244.
35. Id. at 236–38.
36. Id. at 242–44.
37. Id. at 238–39. Even good-natured/supportive staff members offered less emotional support as
well as substantive assistance than was observed by good-natured/supportive individuals in Ptacek and
Wan’s studies. Id. at 236.
38. Id. at 239–42.
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supportive demeanor. Thus, ironically, staff members punished those
applicants who were most actively engaged in helping themselves. These
responses also correspond with the stereotype of the “perfect victim,”
40
who is characterized as passive and not self-asserting. In this way, “staff
members reinforced—whether intentionally or not—a dominant trope
41
about appropriate behavior for victims under the guise of neutrality.”
Staff members also shaped protection order applications in
problematic ways by discouraging or withholding assistance from some
applicants, and—more routinely—by excluding some types of relief, and
by limiting applicant narratives. In particular, staff members excluded
assistance with available economic relief by not mentioning the relief was
42
available, discouraging applicants who requested disfavored relief from
applying, and not offering assistance with the forms necessary to obtain
43
the relief, even when its availability was disclosed. Staff members also
routinized the drafting of supporting affidavits in ways that limited
narratives of abuse to recent physical abuse that could be easily reported
44
in a chronological fashion. The latter finding is consistent with linguist
Shonna Trinch’s study of paralegals in a prosecutor’s office assisting
45
Latina survivors with protection order applications. Trinch found that
the paralegals helped to transform survivor narratives into the linear
form of narrative preferred by the court, but in doing so failed to provide
46
the supportive function sought by survivors, who wanted to be heard.
Thus, while providing an essential function—helping survivors access
protection order remedies—the tailoring of narratives for the court also
comes with costs for survivors. Survivors’ claims may be limited or
discouraged altogether, and important contextual facts regarding
nonphysical abuse may be omitted from their declarations; even those
who obtain orders may have their goals in taking legal action only

39. Id. at 243.
40. See Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White
Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1061, 1078–80 (2006).
41. MacDowell, supra note 3, at 246.
42. For example, neither program informed applicants about the availability of restitution. Id. at
248. Additionally, at Program B, applicants were not informed about the availability of attorney fees.
Id. at 248–49.
43. This was the case with child and spousal support at both locations. As a result, judges either
denied the request or continued the case so that the necessary paperwork could be completed and
served. Continuance of the case would not only delay the relief, but might also result in the case being
dropped due to the difficulty many applicants face coming to court.
44. See id. at 250–52 (describing how staff members limited applicants’ narratives).
45. See Shonna L. Trinch, The Advocate as Gatekeeper: The Limits of Politeness in Protective
Order Interviews with Latina Survivors of Domestic Abuse, 5 J. Sociolinguistics 475, 476–77 (2001);
Shonna L. Trinch & Susan Berk-Seligson, Narrating in Protective Order Interviews: A Source of
Interactional Trouble, 31 Language Soc’y 383, 390, 397 (2002).
46. See Trinch & Berk-Seligson, supra note 45, at 410–12.
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partially fulfilled. It also has costs for the system, in that the conventional
narrative is reinforced by the exclusion of alternative or disfavored
48
narratives. These findings also raise the question: what is the
relationship between self-help (and other forms of institutional or quasiinstitutional assistance for survivors) and advocacy-based models?
B. Advocacy in Legal Systems
1.

Lay Advocacy

Lay advocates have traditionally played an important role in providing
services to survivors, including helping them access legal systems. The early
battered women’s movement was a survivor-centered effort, both in that
it focused on the needs of survivors and that many within the movement
49
were themselves former battered women. The idea was to empower
50
victims to become advocates and movement leaders. Client advocacy in
this context was focused on supporting and empowering women to gain
51
greater control of their lives. Accordingly, advocates provided their
clients with emotional support and information about options and
52
resources, and represented their interests within state institutions. In
addition, advocates worked on behalf of battered women as a group for
53
changes in institutional practices as well as law and policy. Andrea
Nichols identifies several key features of this early advocacy. First,
advocates’ understandings of domestic violence and primary practices in
response were guided by feminist meanings derived from the feminist

47. The latter can also lead to denial of subsequent claims, for example if the applicant tries to
plead omitted facts in a later family court case. See MacDowell, supra note 3, at 251.
48. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights
Back, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 75, 123 (2008) (explaining the importance of presenting new narratives
that challenge norms and stereotypes about domestic violence to judges).
49. Ellen Pence, Advocacy on Behalf of Battered Women, in Sourcebook on Violence Against
Women 329, 330 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
50. See Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the
Battered Women’s Movement 66 (1982) (describing the process of politicization at one early shelter).
51. See Joanne Belknap & Hillary Potter, The Trials of Measuring the “Success” of Domestic
Violence Policies, 4 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 559, 561 (2005); Andrea J. Nichols, Meaning-Making
and Domestic Violence Victim Advocacy: An Examination of Feminist Identities, Ideologies, and
Practices, 8 Feminist Criminology 177, 179 (2013) (describing how battered women’s advocates
encouraged survivor autonomy); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 388-61A-0145 (2016) (“Advocacybased counseling means the involvement of a client with an advocate counselor . . . with the primary
focus on safety planning and on empowerment of the client through reinforcing the client’s autonomy
and self determination.”); Arlene N. Weisz, Legal Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors: The
Power of an Informative Relationship, 80 Families Soc’y 138, 145–46 (1999) (describing the role of
advocates in empowering survivors by providing both empathy and vital information).
52. See Pence, supra note 49, at 329 (discussing individual case advocacy as opposed to
institutional or system advocacy).
53. See Nichols, supra note 51, at 181.
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movement of the 1960s. Second, advocates utilized survivor-defined,
55
intersectional, and social change practices.
Survivor defined practices were specifically intended to avoid the
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures associated with patriarchy, which
was at the core of feminist understandings of the problem of male
56
violence against women. These included collaborative, grassroots
approaches designed to facilitate goal setting and decisionmaking by (rather
than for) survivors, and ultimately enable their social and economic
57
empowerment. Intersectional practices, developed and promoted by
women of color, are those that take into account the multiple identities
(such as race, class, and sexuality) in addition to gender that impact the
58
experience of domestic violence. While often neglected by white,
middle-class reformers and activists who focused on gender alone, these
practices nonetheless constituted an essential contribution to
59
antisubordination work. Social change practices sought to change the
underlying conditions of women’s subordination in society and eliminate
60
violence against women.
Advocacy practices that respect and support the decisionmaking of
survivors are associated with better outcomes for women—including
decreasing the likelihood of repeated violence, and helping them to
61
develop their sense of self-efficacy and their identity as legal subjects.
However, research suggests that only those advocates who identify
themselves as feminists also articulate intersectional and social change
62
practice goals. Others take a narrower view, albeit focusing on
empowerment of survivors. Perhaps reflecting this trend, the National
Organization of Victim’s Assistance (“NOVA”) defines advocacy work
minimally as “encouraging a victim to speak for herself or providing her
63
with a voice if she is unable to speak.”
Numerous factors can interfere with the advocate’s role however,
even within this narrower definition. In particular, researchers document

54. Id. at 178. Note that this does not mean that all advocates self-identified as feminists.
According to most accounts, there was significant ideological diversity in the movement (including
among feminists). See Schechter, supra note 50, at 43–52; Pence, supra note 49, at 332.
55. Nichols, supra note 51, at 178.
56. Id. at 178–79.
57. Id. at 179.
58. Id. at 180–81; see also Schechter, supra note 50, at 48–49 (discussing the influence of black
and third world feminists on the battered women’s movement); Pence, supra note 49, at 332
(discussing perspectives of women of color in the early movement).
59. Nichols, supra note 51, at 180.
60. Id. at 181.
61. See id. at 179; see also Ptacek, supra note 7, at 177 (describing the positive impact of
advocates on survivors’ experiences in court).
62. Nichols, supra note 51, at 182–83 (citing studies); id. at 191–92 (describing findings).
63. Trinch, supra note 45, at 476 (citing Marlene A. Young, Victim Assistance: Frontiers and
Fundamentals 28 (1993)).
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challenges to advocacy that result from professionalization and
institutionalization of advocacy functions, including the imposition of
hierarchical and bureaucratic structures and values that disconnect
64
advocates from clients and from larger reform goals. In these contexts,
professional or system goals and objectives overtake client-centered
65
ones. Even within nongovernmental organizations, advocacy is impacted
by case-driven approaches and professional goals and objectives that are
66
not derived from clients’ self-identified needs. Further, due to
professionalization, survivors have limited pathways to become advocates,
and NGOs’ objectives are unlikely to include organizing and other social
67
change work that can include survivors.
Another challenge for advocates working within institutions is their
dual role as gatekeepers. Trinch notes two gatekeeping tasks that
paralegals helping protection order applicants in the prosecutor’s office
face:
First, protective order interviewers need to determine whether clients
are eligible for the order, and second, they need to indicate to clients
that there are very specific ways that legal complaints must be couched.
In other words, interviewers must signal to clients that their lay norms
and ways of narrating abuse are not, in fact, what the court wants to
68
hear.

For system advocates and others working in contexts where they perform
only or primarily as gatekeepers, this function arguably subsumes the
advocacy function completely.
2.

Legal Aid

Working in collaboration with lay advocates, legal aid attorneys
have also played an important role in advocacy for survivors, including
through law reform. One such effort was the coalition of legal aid
64. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 51, at 182 (discussing the “growing body of research outlines
challenges of professionalization” for feminist advocacy strategies); id. at 193–94 (discussing the
relationship between feminist advocacy and organizational practices); Pence, supra note 49, at 339
(discussing the impact of professionalization on advocates’ attitudes toward and relationships with
survivors).
65. See Schechter, supra note 50, at 243 (describing how “the goal of sustaining a vision of
women’s liberation and building a political movement was lost in the struggle to start, fund, manage,
legitimate, and maintain programs for battered women”); see also Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive
State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence 70
(2008) (“Currently, as part of the process of making battered women’s shelters more professional, a
mandate exists for changing the primary methods by which shelters work—requiring them to move
away from encouraging women’s transformation through consciousness raising to a more serviceoriented model that involves administrating clients’ needs.”).
66. See Bumiller, supra note 65, at 70 (discussing the negative impacts of professional case
management on abuse survivors).
67. See Pence, supra note 49, at 340–41 (arguing for advocates to return to the inclusion of
survivors in decisionmaking and to community organizing).
68. Trinch, supra note 45, at 477.
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attorneys and advocates who helped draft and pass the nation’s first
69
protection order statue in Pennsylvania. Within a few years, protection
70
order legislation passed in every state. Although the breadth of
legislation varies among the states, the goal was to expand and improve
upon existing injunctive relief, available only in divorce, by providing
expedited access to economic remedies for both married and unmarried
survivors as well as orders that the adverse party stay away from the
71
applicant and cease abusive conduct. Economic orders typically include
72
orders for child support, spousal support, and restitution. Orders for
73
attorney’s fees and the exclusive use of property may also be available.
Importantly, although violation of a protection order is a crime in every
state, protection orders were intended to provide survivors with an
alternative to the criminal legal system, and to be enforceable through
74
the civil contempt process. These goals specifically reflected the input
of legal aid and other coalition members who represented the interests of
low-income women of color, who sought alternatives to criminal legal
75
responses to domestic violence.
As with lay advocates, however, the role of legal aid in law reform is
compromised by structural developments, as well as by countervailing or
76
conflicting values. Chief among the former are drops in funding,
combined with restrictions on activities for legal aid organizations funded
77
through the federal Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”). Among other

69. See Margaret Klaw & Mary Scherf, Feminist Advocacy: The Evolution of Pennsylvania’s
Protection from Abuse Act, 1 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 21, 21 (1993) (describing “collaboration
among grassroots women’s advocates, legal services attorneys and sensitive legislators”); see also
Schechter, supra note 50, at 162–65 (describing early civil legal reforms for battered women);
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, VAWA @ 20: Improving Civil Legal Assistance for Ending Gender Violence,
CUNY L. Rev. Footnote F. (Nov. 21, 2014) (describing the background of protection order
legislation).
70. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 910–1006 (1993); Domestic
Violence: Protective Orders and the Role of Police Enforcement, Asset (ACLU/Women’s Rights
Project, New York, N.Y.), June 1, 2007, at 1 (citing Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence,
State Protection Order Laws (2005)).
71. Interview with Barbara Hart, Dir. of Strategic Justice Initiatives and Dir. of Law & Policy,
Violence Against Women Initiatives, Muskie School of Public Service, Cutler Institute for Health &
Soc. Policy, Univ. of S. Me. (Nov. 21, 2013) (notes on file with author) (describing motives for
protection order initiatives brought by legal aid attorneys and activists).
72. Klein & Orloff, supra note 70, at 996–97.
73. Id. at 1001, 1004.
74. Interview with Barbara Hart, supra note 71; see also Schechter, supra note 50, at 163.
75. Interview with Barbara Hart, supra note 71; see also Pence, supra note 49, at 334 (describing
why activists were reluctant to focus on criminal justice remedies).
76. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest
Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1591, 1618 (2006) (reporting that the majority of publically
funded law firms are focused on individual services rather than law reform).
77. See Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, A Call to End Federal
Restrictions on Legal Aid for the Poor 3–4 (2009) (describing efforts by conservatives to dismantle
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limitations, LSC funded programs are prohibited from engaging in
78
lobbying or other legislative advocacy with government officials.
Therefore, under the current federal regime, legal aid programs would be
unable to take an affirmative role in developing legislation like the
original protection order statute. Additional restrictions ban the use of
LSC or private funds for organizing activities, such as those undertaken
by grassroots coalitions that helped to pass early domestic violence
79
reforms. These structural developments support a more service-oriented
role for legal aid, as opposed to a reform-oriented one. However, they do
not fully explain the shift away from law reform.
Legal aid programs may still engage in many reform activities,
despite restrictions. They may use non-LSC funds to “respond to a
request from a legislator or other government official to testify or give
80
information, analysis, or comments on a bill.” They may also
communicate with the public, their clients, and the media about pending
bills or regulations, and use the litigation process to challenge existing
81
legislation or rules. Additionally, public funds (for example, from
IOLTA accounts) can be used for organizing activities, and the rules do
not prohibit using LSC funds to provide legal information and advice to
82
other organizations that have a reform agenda. Collaboration and
partnership with non-LSC organizations is also permissible, so long as
83
the program avoids LSC-restricted activities. Indeed, performance
standards introduced in 2007 encourage work resulting in systemic
84
benefits for low-income communities, not just individual clients. As a
result, some have argued that the shift by legal aid programs to a narrow,
legal services approach is more a crisis of will than a result of federal
85
restrictions.

the legal services program); Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United
States, 5 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 11, 29–31 (2003) (describing federal cutbacks to legal aid).
78. See Diller & Savner, supra note 77, at 5–15 (describing restrictions imposed on LSC funded
programs); Alan W. Houseman & Linda E. Perle, What You May and May Not Do Under the Legal
Services Corporation Restrictions, in National Center on Poverty Law, Poverty Law Manual for
the New Lawyer (2002).
79. Houseman & Perle, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Legal Servs. Corp., Advisory Opinion AO-2015-003 on D.C. Housing-Initiative
Coordinator (Nov. 9, 2015) (advising how an LSC-funded entity could employ a coordinator for a
collaboration with non-LSC entities who engaged in LSC-restricted activities such as lobbying).
84. Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal Services,
45 Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 34, 39 (2011).
85. Id. (arguing that legal aid stopped focusing on antipoverty work before federal restrictions
were imposed); see also Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced
Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 474, 577 (1985).
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There is also a question of what counts as law reform. As described
by Peter Margulies, “commentators [on poverty law practice] typically
have linked family law practice with the stereotype of service work as
86
routine and apolitical.” In particular, engagement with family law by
poverty lawyers has been critiqued “because of its supposed tendency to
produce ‘intraclass transfer of resources’ from poor men to poor
87
women.” Such work is viewed as antithetical to the mission of reformers
seeking to restructure power relations between classes and eliminate
88
poverty. Margulies advocates for the view that domestic violence cases
89
challenge patriarchy, and are therefore political. However, “a traditional
concern among poverty lawyers is that family law does not lend itself to an
impact case agenda. This view holds that such individual service work is
not merely apolitical, but is also counterproductive, draining resources
90
away from impact work.” As a result, while legal aid programs perform
a lot of family law work, this engagement may not be associated with law
reform goals, including in cases involving domestic violence, and even for
those legal aid programs that engage in law reform activities in other
91
practice areas.
These attitudes and trends in poverty law practice, along with the
changes in advocacy models for survivors discussed above, are evident in
the histories and practices of the programs in this study. The next Part
provides information about the study, including a description of each
program partnership, and an overview of the application process at each
location. A brief explanation of the methodology used in the study is also
provided.
II. This Study
A. The Programs
This study was conducted in two western states at self-help
92
programs that I will refer to as Program A and Program B. Both
programs operate as partnerships between county courts and NGOs, and

86. Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work
Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 493,
509 (1996).
87. Id. (quoting Abel, supra note 85, at 609).
88. See Smith, supra note 84, at 36 (“The resolution of these individual demands for personal
service, either singly or in the aggregate, has no necessary correlation whatsoever to the causes or
conditions of poverty.”).
89. See Margulies, supra note 86, at 511–12.
90. Id. at 509.
91. See infra Part IV.B (discussing views about family law held by leadership at the LSC-funded
program partner in this study).
92. The programs and persons who participated in this study are not identified in order to
maintain their confidentiality.
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are located in courthouses serving metropolitan areas. Both programs
93
are utilized primarily by women of color. Available data shows that
most litigants had low educational attainment and spoke a language
94
other than English as their primary language.
Program A consists of several self-help program locations operated
as partnerships between the county and a legal aid organization
(“LAO”). The county provides space and equipment for the program,
and the LAO provides staff and manages program operations. The LAO
previously provided self-help services in all but one of the current
program locations using a limited scope representation model staffed by
volunteer attorneys, and supplemented with staff and pro bono
representation at hearings. These ancillary programs have largely been
disbanded in recent years due to decreases in grant funding and layoffs of
staff attorneys. Additionally, one of the program locations was previously
operated by a shelter organization, and volunteers from the shelter
continue to work as unpaid staff under the current model. At other
locations, volunteers supplement paid interns and a full-time program
director, who oversees and manages the program. This program serves
95
more than 4000 applicants annually.
Program B provides self-help services at a single location. The
program is run as a partnership between the county and a nonlegal
domestic violence services organization (“DVSO”). In addition to
providing space and equipment for the program, the county funds eight
staff positions, including a director, four other full-time employees, and
three part-time staff members. The DVSO funds two additional full-time
96
staff positions. This program started out run solely by the DVSO, using
space provided by the court. The county stepped in with funds for a staff
member and took over the program. The DVSO continued to participate
by providing their trained advocates. However, the DVSO has no role in

93. In 2009, an average of seventy-eight percent of people who filed a protection order after
receiving services at Program A were women; 86.5% were racial or ethnic minorities. Data collected at
Program B in 2012 showed that protection order applicants were more than four times as likely to be
women than men; less than half were White.
94. In 2009, 86.5% of protection order applicants helped at Program A were racial or ethnic
minorities, fifty-three percent spoke a language other than English as a preferred language, and only
twenty-six percent had attended some college; less than thirteen percent had a college degree. Given
the links between educational attainment and income disparity, a relatively low average income in this
group can be assumed. See, e.g., Steven Strauss, The Connection Between Education, Income Inequality,
and Unemployment, HuffPost Bus. (Nov. 2, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
steven-strauss/the-connection-between-ed_b_1066401.html. Similar data was not available for Program B.
95. Based on 2009 data drawn from new protection order cases filed at each program location in
four one-week periods.
96. After the data collection period, this was reduced to one staff member due to budgeting
constraints.

J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

June 2016]

FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS

6/19/2016 11:59 AM

1315

the administration of the program or policy setting. The program serves
97
more than 5000 people annually.
B. The Application Process
Applying for a protection order is generally, and at both of these
locations, a two-step process. Applicants initiate the process by filing ex
parte (that is, without notice, or with limited notice, to the adverse party)
for a temporary protection order. The application consists of a form on
which the applicant identifies what orders are requested, and a
supporting declaration that sets out the factual basis for the relief
requested. Under state law in both program locations, applicants can
request orders including for exclusive use of property, child support,
spousal support, restitution, and attorneys fees, as well as that the
adverse party stay away from the applicant, refrain from specified
conduct, and surrender guns. The court may grant the requested orders
(in whole or in part), deny the application outright, or deny the
temporary order but set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
Temporary orders are limited to stay-away and orders for exclusive use
of property, and last about three to four weeks. If the court sets the case
for hearing (step two), the applicant may seek an order for a longer
98
time. Both programs utilize nonlawyer staff members to assist
applicants in preparing and filing their applications. However, they do so
99
in different ways.
At Program A, staff members provide applicants with one-on-one
assistance completing the application form. A staff member asks the
applicant questions about what orders the applicant wants, while filling
100
out the forms on a computer or by hand. The staff member also asks
the applicant to explain the basis for the orders (such as, why the
applicant wants the protection order), and uses this information to draft
the applicant’s supporting declaration. An attorney staff member then

97. Based on 2012 data.
98. In the jurisdiction served by Program A, the judge can grant a permanent order after a
hearing, or continue a temporary order for a longer period of time. State law at Program B requires
the applicant to request an extension of the temporary order on or subsequent to her application. The
temporary order can be extended for a maximum of six months after the hearing.
99. Staff members also provide applicants with printed information. At Program A, this includes
information about the legal process, including how to file and serve the application, and how to
prepare for the evidentiary hearing. At Program B, staff members reviewing the application provide
some applicants with an information sheet that includes contact information for the DVSO, and that
lists considerations for safety planning. I will analyze these documents in a separate article.
100. Advocates led applicants through the process using prompts drawn from the form. Prompts
were generated by the computer software, or by the advocate using the form. In either case, prompts
mirrored the question on the form. However, as discussed further below, not all categories of relief on
the form were covered.

J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

1316

6/19/2016 11:59 AM

[Vol. 67:1299

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
101

reviews the completed application before it is filed. In contrast,
applicants at Program B complete the application form themselves
before meeting with a staff member. The completed form is then
reviewed by one of the DVSO-funded staff members, who may augment
the application with additional facts or details disclosed by the applicant
102
during the review. There is no attorney supervision or review at
Program B.
The programs also differ in how work is delegated, and in how the
roles that staff members perform are described. At Program A, all nonattorney staff members perform the identical work in assisting applicants,
and are called “advocates” in program materials. At Program B, staff
members who interact with applicants can be divided into two categories:
(1) front desk staff members, who interact with all applicants and answer
the phones, answer applicants’ questions, conduct initial screenings
(which may result in redirecting would-be applicants), hand out applications,
and provide instructions on completing the form; and (2) back office staff
members, who review applications. Back office staff members include the
two DVSO employees, who are differentiated in that they are called
“advocates,” and are identified as such by a placard on each of their
desks.
Finally, the programs differ in their involvement with the rest of the
protection order process. Applicants at Program A are responsible for
filing the completed application and delivering the application and any
orders that result for service on the adverse party. Conversely, Program
B manages the administrative aspects of the process, including filing and
delivery of documents for service; staff members also prepare the final
order after hearing. However, obtaining a temporary order takes longer
at this location. While applicants at Program A typically receive a
temporary order within twenty-four hours, receiving an order at Program
B usually takes at least two days.
C. Methodology
This study uses traditional qualitative methods for grounded,
exploratory ethnographic research, including nonparticipant observation
(of courthouse activities, self-help services, and interactions between
applicants and staff members), and informal, semi-structured interviews
with everyday actors (program staff members, legal aid attorneys, and
103
survivor advocates). Observations took place at Program A over
101. The attorney is usually off-site. Staff members e-mail or fax completed applications to the
attorney for review. Applications that are completed by applicants without a staff member’s help and
then reviewed by a staff member are not reviewed by an attorney.
102. If it is very busy, county-employed staff members review completed applications as well.
103. See Juliet Corbin & Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory 12–13 (3d ed. 2007) (defining grounded theory as
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several months in 2009 and 2010, and at Program B from December 2013
104
105
to August 2014. Observations were recorded in field notes. Field
notes were then analyzed through an inductive process of open coding
that identified recurring themes, patterns, and topics; these became core
106
categories for further analysis. The findings that emerged through this
process showed how demeanor was shaped by the organization of work
within the programs. These findings are detailed next in Part III. The
findings and implications for systemic advocacy are then discussed in
detail in Part IV.

“derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process. In this
method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another”).
This study also fits into the subfield of institutional ethnography. See Elizabeth Townsend, Good
Intentions Overruled: A Critique of Empowerment in the Routine Organization of Mental
Health Services 17–29 (1998) (describing the key processes of institutional ethnography). See
generally Marjorie L. Devault, Introduction: What Is Institutional Ethnography?, 53 Soc. Probs. 294
(2006) (describing the field of institutional ethnography and providing examples of research projects
that use this methodology). As this project studies multiple locations, it can also be viewed as a
multisited ethnography. See generally George E. Marcus, Ethnography in/of the World System: The
Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography, 24 Ann. Rev. Anthro. 95 (1995) (describing a multisited
approach to ethnographic inquiry). Institutional ethnographers seek to uncover how organizational
work processes shape the activities and conditions of the everyday world. Using texts and discourses as
a starting point, institutional ethnographers focus on identifying “institutional case management
processes and the logic, thinking and assumptions that support them.” Jane M. Sadusky et al., The
Praxis Safety and Accountability Audit: Practicing a “Sociology for People,” 16 Violence Against
Women 1031, 1034 (2010); see also Devault, supra note 103, at 294 (noting that institutional
ethnographers seek to explain the world, rather than build theory).
104. Observation data totaling eighty-four hours were transcribed from these preliminary
collections; an additional 150 hours of data collected from the protection order courtroom, and lobby
areas outside the courtroom were also transcribed. Observations at Program B were conducted until
no new variations (for example, of demeanor type) or contradictions were observed. This data was
consistent with observation data from Program A.
105. Field notes consisted of notes recorded simultaneously or contemporaneously with
observations in the field (and augmented after leaving the field), and notes recorded surreptitiously at
opportune moments, so as not to influence or disturb what was being observed. The first technique
was used when observing front desk staff at Program B; the second was used primarily when observing
advocates interacting with applicants. See John Lofland et al., Analyzing Social Settings: A
Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis 108–16 (4th ed. 2006); W. Lawrence Neuman,
Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 443–49 (2009) (regarding
techniques for recording notes in and out of the field).
106. See Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory:
Strategies for Qualitative Research 105–13 (1967); see also Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, Of
Rhetoric and Representation: The Four Faces of Ethnography, 49 Soc. Q. 1, 12 (2008) (describing the
use of inductive analysis in ethnography). Additionally, in order to further situate the research, we also
reviewed secondary materials, including informational materials distributed to applicants at the
programs, and records concerning the protection order process maintained by partnering
organizations. We also conducted legislative research on the history of civil protection order laws, and
archival research and interviews with participants in the movement for protection order legislation on
the connection between law reform and the battered women’s movement. See Corbin & Strauss,
supra note 103, at 11–12 (describing the variety of sources from which qualitative data can be derived
for grounded theory).
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III. Demeanor and the Organization of Work
A. Focus on Forms
Researchers have found that the organization of work within courts
and organizational culture can structure the nature of interactions in
protection order proceedings. For example, Jill Adams’s study of the
protection order process in a Canadian court found that the division of
labor into piecemeal work and a focus on efficiency, along with an
emphasis on the uniform treatment of applicants, left no space for court
personnel to feel empathy or get to know or care about the women
107
applying for orders. Some of these findings are echoed in Wan’s study,
which found that a focus on efficient processing of orders resulted in a
more bureaucratic approach to client services among some advocates,
and irritation when people needed more help because it slowed things
108
down. Similarly, Trinch notes that paralegals assisting protection order
applicants may act in ways that appear bureaucratic as a result of
109
performing repetitive tasks.
The task of preparing a supporting
affidavit for a protection order that meets the legal system’s demands for
a linear narrative also shapes the nature of the interaction between
110
participants in the process. As noted above, Trinch’s study shows how
paralegals working with Latina survivors contort and constrain survivors’
accounts of abuse, while helping them create narratives that are more
111
likely to succeed at court.
In this context, the more supportive
112
dimensions of advocacy such as validation and empowerment are lost.
As in these prior studies, the programs in this study were organized
around the processing of protection order applications in ways that
limited staff members’ engagement with applicants, and potentially, the
value of their services. The emphasis on forms started at intake, which at
both programs focused on screening applicants to see if they were
qualified for a protection order, and made no attempt to identify safety
113
issues or other legal or service needs. Afterwards, applicants either
114
progressed to the form-filling stage or were turned away or redirected.

107. Jill Adams, The Civil Restraining Order Application Process: Textually Mediated Institutional
Case Management, 10 Ethnography 185, 202–03 (2009).
108. Wan, supra note 7, at 624–25.
109. Trinch, supra note 45, at 497.
110. Id. at 477; see also id. at 497 (noting that advocates co-construct the account of abuse with
survivors).
111. Id. at 497.
112. Id. at 498.
113. See Stoever, supra note 27, at 353–54 (arguing that safety planning is an essential component
of advocacy).
114. The applicants who were turned away because the program was too busy to assist them, or
because they had arrived after the cut off time, were generally told to return the next day the program
was open. Applicants who did not identify a qualifying relationship were generally redirected to apply
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As noted, at Program A applicants who received assistance completing
the application form sat with an advocate, who completed the form on
the computer (or on occasion by hand if the computer was down or there
were no computers available). At Program B, applicants received
instructions on completing the forms and then filled them out
themselves. If applicants were subsequently seen by an advocate, the
focus was on ascertaining whether the forms were complete and accurate.
Indeed, although both Programs described a broad approach to services
on their websites and other materials, matters beyond processing the
application form were entirely peripheral to the process at these
115
programs.
Unlike advocates observed by Wan, who sometimes assisted women
in finding a shelter or completing forms in other aspects of their family
116
law case, interactions with staff members at Programs A and B were
almost exclusively limited to the process of obtaining a temporary
protection order. Information about safety planning (provided only at
Program B) and referrals was relegated to printed materials that were
distributed to applicants before they left the location. Even information
about the protection order process beyond the temporary order—for
instance, preparing for the subsequent evidentiary hearing—which was
117
provided only at Program A, was provided on a handout. Moreover,
individuals who were not assisted at either program, or who dropped off
applications at Program B without seeing an advocate, typically did not
receive these materials at all. Further, as in Adams’s study, the division
of labor also fragmented staff members’ contact with applicants at
Program B—in this case between front desk staff members who screened
applicants and instructed them on filling out forms, and the advocates
who reviewed applicants’ completed paperwork. These conditions
limited staff members’ ability to connect with applicants and understand
or care about their needs and concerns, much less address them. Other
aspects of the workplace environment may also help explain staff
members’ demeanor, including the physical environment.

for an anti-stalking or harassment order. Staff at Program B sometimes also screened for whether the
adverse party was in custody; if so, they redirected the applicant to apply for an emergency protection
order.
115. The website for the program of which Program A is a part advertises, “advocates provide
critical information and assistance to victims of domestic violence, including . . . referrals to myriad
social services.” The website for Program B claims the program aims to provide “information
regarding court-related procedures, safety planning and community awareness of domestic violence
issues.”
116. See Wan, supra note 7, at 619 (providing examples of advocates providing support and
assistance to applicants beyond the application process).
117. These materials are themselves expressive in ways akin to demeanor and will be analyzed in
another article.
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B. Self-Help Work Environment
As Wan notes, while advocates’ bureaucratic—or worse—treatment
of applicants is troubling, “it is important to recognize the conditions
118
under which [applicants] received such treatment.” The conditions
faced by staff members at the locations in this study are detailed below.
1. Lack of Privacy
Wan observed that the environment in which the advocates she
119
observed worked “was dismal, dirty, and crowded.” These advocates
120
also carried high case volumes. Wan reasoned that it was “possible that
advocates exhibited bureaucratic demeanor because they found such
demeanor to be the easiest way of working in a small and dismal
environment and the most efficient way of assisting large numbers of
121
people.” While I would not describe the facilities at Program A or B as
dirty or especially dingy, they were busy and lacked privacy. Staff
members’ awareness of the volume of applicants needing their attention
was undoubtedly a factor influencing their interactions with individual
applicants, leading to some applicants being turned away when the program
was at capacity.
Additionally, both locations at Program A were particularly
cramped, and there were no partitions between advocates as they
assisted applicants. As a result, exchanges between applicants and staff
members could easily be overheard. Similarly, exchanges between front
desk staff and applicants at Program B were generally audible to
everyone else in line or in the crowded waiting room. The only relatively
private space at either location was at Program B, which had partitions
separating the advocates from one another and other staff members. In
the majority of interactions at these programs, however, the design of the
program site did not foster the potential for intimacy suggested by the
emphasis on one-on-one assistance. Moreover, neither program had
childcare, and applicants often brought their children. This added to the
crowded and sometimes noisy atmosphere of the programs. Further, the
presence of young children was not conducive to sharing intimate
information about abuse, especially in cases where the child was also a
victim, or where the abuser was the child’s parent or another family
member.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Wan, supra note 7, at 626.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627.
Id.
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2. Inadequate Translation Services
Limited resources of other kinds also created tensions for staff and
applicants alike and inhibited effective assistance. This is exemplified by
the lack of adequate translation services. Applicants at both locations
were primarily Latino/a with many speaking English as a second language,
while staff members at both programs were primarily monolingual in
English. At Program A, there were no Spanish-speaking staff members
who regularly worked at the busiest location. As a result, applicants were
sometimes turned away because they could not be helped. At Program
B, two of the four part-time front desk workers were bilingual in Spanish,
but none of the staff members who reviewed applications spoke Spanish.
Program B used court translators for monolingual applicants, but this
meant that applicants had to wait for a translator to be free to assist
them. As a result, applicants who needed a translator waited significantly
longer than other applicants to see an advocate. The frequent inability of
staff members to communicate with non-English speaking applicants
obviously hindered their ability to interact and relate with these individuals.
Moreover, the inability of staff members to understand applicants who did
not speak fluent English triggered patronizing/condescending demeanor on
at least one occasion.
3. Lack of Training and Accountability
Staff members also received minimal training, focused primarily on
the application process. At Program A, staff members received
approximately one half-day of training, which included a brief overview
of the “cycle of violence” in domestic violence relationships and no
training on intersectional concerns relating to race, ethnicity, or class.
Front desk staff at Program B received only what the program
administrator called “on the job” training for their regular job duties.
This consisted of shadowing and then being observed by another worker
until they were deemed competent to manage the desk on their own.
Only the two advocates at Program B had received intensive training on
domestic violence, including cultural competency training, which was
provided by the program’s shelter partner. However, as discussed further
below, their relationship to their funding advocacy organization was very
attenuated, which diminished the value of their access to training and
other supportive resources as an ongoing matter.
Further, all staff members were essentially unsupervised and largely
unaccountable to the public they served. None of the workers observed
were subject to any kind of regular employment evaluation by a
supervisor. Program A conducted annual mailed surveys of applicants
who had used the program, and a minimal number were returned each
year with generally favorable results. Program B had never conducted an
evaluation of its services or staff. By the same token, neither did they
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receive support for the stress and burnout likely experienced from their
work environments.
4. Lack of Support for Vicarious Trauma
Wan identifies secondary or vicarious trauma as another factor that
122
may contribute to bureaucratic treatment of applicants by advocates.
Researchers have found that counselors working with victims of sexual
assault and other traumatic experiences may over time begin to suffer
symptoms of vicarious traumatization or post-traumatic stress disorder as
123
a result. Counselors also struggled to deal with the ineffectiveness of
courts and other systems that were supposed to help their clients but
124
failed to do so. In this way, being ensconced within ineffective systems
became a source of trauma for both those helping victims and for victims
themselves. “Although advocates are not counselors,” Wan notes that
“they engage[] in some of the same activities as counselors, [such as]
125
hearing repeated stories of horrific abuse . . . .” They might therefore
react bureaucratically to applicants in order to avoid the adverse effects
126
of trauma that can result from emotional involvement with clients.
Similarly, staff members in self-help programs may find it easier to
remain emotionally distant from applicants to whom they can offer little
substantive help in exchanges that may cause them emotional stress. This
problem may be exacerbated for advocates who are isolated from
erstwhile sources of support, such as advocacy-based organizations. The
next Subpart discusses the organization of program partnerships in
relation to the self-help work environment and self-help services.
C. Isolation from Advocacy Organizations
Staff members as well as applicants suffered from program partnerships
that failed to utilize advocacy resources. Instead, these relationships
sometimes created new hierarchies that, like bureaucratization, inhibited
advocacy functions. For example, at Program A, volunteer advocates
from a local shelter organization had previously run one of the program
locations themselves. When legal aid took over the program, these
advocates remained as volunteers. Advocates expressed frustration with
the new program, which they regarded as less efficient and less client
centered than their own. They reported that, by assisting applicants in

122. Id.
123. Lisa McCann & Laurie Anne Pearlman, Vicarious Traumatization: A Framework for
Understanding the Psychological Effects of Working with Victims, 3 J. Traumatic Stress 131, 144
(1990); see also Laura J. Schauben & Patricia A. Frazier, Vicarious Trauma: The Effects on Female
Counselors of Working with Sexual Violence Survivors, 19 Psych. Women Q. 49, 50 (1995).
124. Schauben & Frazier, supra note 123, at 57.
125. Wan, supra note 7, at 627.
126. Id.
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groups, they had helped more applicants and had provided more
127
complete assistance than the current program. Legal aid, however,
made them work with applicants individually. While advocates reported
that completing forms on the computer was easier, it slowed things down
when the computers malfunctioned, which happened frequently.
Advocates were also slowed down by the requirement that lawyers
review the applications they completed and resented what they perceived
as a lack of appreciation for their expertise. Additionally, they resented
being cut off from judges and the administrative staff of the court, with
whom they previously communicated directly, receiving direct feedback
on their work, and discussing problems regarding the legal process. Now
that legal aid had assumed these roles, advocates felt disconnected from
the court and meaningful feedback and communication. One advocate
128
said of attorney supervision, “we take umbrage.”
Advocates at Program A also believed that the legal aid attorneys
were insufficiently victim centered. They pointed in particular to the
program’s policy on helping represented applicants. Applicants sometimes
revealed that they had an attorney who was helping them with their family
law case, but were proceeding without counsel in the protection order
process. Advocates reported that the program had previously assisted
these applicants because it was economically beneficial to the applicant
to receive the program’s help rather than to use her lawyer, and the court
accepted this practice. Legal aid, however, insisted that applicants with
attorneys be turned away, telling advocates, “their attorneys are just lazy
and dumping clients on us,” and seemingly disregarded the impact on the
applicant.
These advocates also noted some improvements with attorney
involvement. In particular, they reported learning a broader view of
domestic violence: previously, the program had only assisted female
applicants, and not men or adverse parties, even if the latter were
women. Advocates spoke of learning more about same-sex victims who
were men under the new regime, and also to empathize with respondents’
need for assistance. One advocate noted that attorney review relieves her
worry that advocates will be blamed for negative outcomes. However,
advocates appeared wary of what one advocate called a shift from
“victims to litigants” under the new model.
Advocates at Program B also lacked effective input into program
practices, although the shelter organization paying their salaries was
touted as a program “partner.” Moreover, the client-centered goals of
the shelter partner, to the extent internalized and shared by the

127. Specifically, they had helped applicants with financial disclosures required in applications for
child or spousal support, which the current program failed to do.
128. Interview with Program A Advocate (Apr. 29, 2010) (transcript on file with author).
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advocates, seemed to conflict with the expectations of neutrality placed
upon them by program administrators. These dynamics are illustrated by
tensions between one of the shelter advocates and program
administrators over compliance with state child abuse reporting laws.
The shelter partner at Program B had a policy of exercising discretion to
avoid reporting in most cases unless there was a clear indication of
ongoing child endangerment. If a report was necessary, the policy was to
encourage the client to make the report. In contrast, the program’s policy
was to report any suspected abuse, even if it was outside the advocate’s
direct knowledge or not clearly ongoing. One advocate described her
efforts to resist this broader definition of reportable abuse, including
refusing to call child protection authorities regarding a case that met the
program’s definition of a reportable case, but not the shelter’s policy.
When the program administrator contacted authorities about the case,
the advocate continued to resist by refusing to provide additional
information to the investigator who contacted her to follow up. This
advocate had also urged the program administrator to provide a
disclosure to applicants about the reporting policy before they met with
an advocate, a proposal that had not been implemented.
Advocates at Program B were also separated from the shelter
organization partnering with the court, physically and in terms of training
and support. The shelter program director reported that these advocates
were hesitant to attend trainings and team meetings, where other
advocates obtained vital information and support, because it meant
fewer applicants would receive individual assistance at the program. This
isolation also undermined the shelter’s goal of connecting the program to
system advocacy—for example, by promoting referrals of applicants who
had a related criminal case to shelter advocates in the prosecutor’s office.
The program director reported that advocates in the program rarely
made appropriate referrals to outside services, presumably because of
the attenuated nature of their relationship to shelter goals and
129
resources.
These conflicts highlight tensions between the partiality of the
advocacy perspective and the goal of impartiality in self-help services, as
well as the relative powerlessness of the advocacy-based program partner
to set policy at this location. At both locations, the isolation from
advocacy organizations appeared to drain staff members’ morale and
may have affected demeanor toward applicants as staff met what they
perceived as lowered expectations for individualized assistance and support.

129. Legal aid attorneys in the community also reported that they did not receive referrals from
the self-help program, although they encouraged these referrals by leaving fliers about their services
with the staff.
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IV. Implications and Conclusions
A. Future Research
More studies of NGO-court partnerships to provide self-help
services are needed to learn more about what organizational, system, and
program differences matter to how services are provided, as well as how
these programs impact the organizations and systems of which they are a
part. Future studies should also examine different models of service
delivery, such as those using limited scope representation for completing
forms.
In addition, future studies should explore the impact of local legal
cultures on services for unrepresented litigants. Several findings in the
present study suggest the role of local legal culture on decisions about
the design of the programs and the expressive qualities of staff members.
For example, the decision at Program B not to help applicants complete
forms was consistent with comments from staff members and other
players in the system that evidenced a mistrust of both applicants and
advocacy processes—or what might be called an “anti-legal” or “antilegal advocacy” culture that applied to domestic violence cases. For
example, the director of Program B and local legal aid attorneys thought
judges would give less credibility to applicants who had assistance
completing their forms. One judge reportedly told the director, when she
proposed providing computers for applicants to use, that he preferred to
actually see their handwriting, as though he could glean something of
their credibility from seeing it.
In contrast, system participants at Program A evinced a more
positive attitude about the benefits to be gained through assisting
applicants with the legal process and a more positive attitude toward
lawyers and legalism in general. This may have supported the greater
level of assistance provided to applicants at Program A. For example, the
director at Program A described a judicial officer with a history of
hostility to domestic violence claims who had a better opinion of
applicants after the LAO took over because the quality of declarations
had purportedly gone up, and the program was supervised by “officers of
the court.” That said, this heightened credibility was associated with
lawyers in a nonadvocacy role—as “court officers” rather than zealous
advocates. Moreover, Program A as well as Program B limited the
supportive role of staff members through processes that restricted
individualized assistance. Together, however, these examples and the
influence of the court on staff attitudes and advice to applicants suggests
the importance of studying self-help in the larger context of the court,
including judicial attitudes, and the legal system of which it is a part.
More generally, these findings show the need for an expansive
research agenda that considers the impact of access to justice
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interventions on advocacy systems and on substantive justice goals, as
well as on more narrowly defined case outcomes. Greater use of
ethnographic methods to study self-help services and court systems will
help this effort. By building knowledge from the ground up, researchers
can uncover and describe how structures of power and subordination are
constructed through everyday interactions in legal settings, and identify
how they might be dismantled.
B. What Can Be Done to Improve Self-Help Now
Some solutions to the structural problems recounted herein are
straightforward, albeit possibly challenging to implement when resources
are limited: self-help programs should find ways to provide adequate
translation services, improve provisions for privacy and childcare needs,
and consider whether their hours are likely to accommodate applicant
availability. Referrals should be available and readily provided. Staff
members should receive training on domestic violence and cultural
competency, and programs should support self-care for vicarious trauma.
For lay advocacy partners, staff members could do rotations in the
program in order to keep their training fresh and expose them to other
aspects of advocacy work. Given the different roles lay advocates
perform in self-help programs and for clients, lay advocacy organizations
should also consider sending advocates with clients who use self-help
programs.
More broadly, NGOs should assess whether they are balancing
advocacy with self-help and partnering with courts in ways that increase
rather than constrain representation and reform. The history of the
programs in this study shows how self-help might replace or disrupt
preexisting programs and alternative advocacy models. By focusing on a
single legal remedy, self-help has a much narrower focus than traditional
lay advocacy, or legal advocacy aimed at systemic reform, yet may absorb
advocacy resources that could be directed more broadly. Here, the
results were mixed. Program A replaced a similarly focused program
that—while more effective in some respects (completing all forms for
economic relief)—lacked the benefits of legal expertise. Lack of legal
expertise could make self-help programs less able to maintain
independence from the court—although the issue of independence is a
complex one.
At Program B, the lack of independence of the program director
from the court is a major issue. As a county employee and a nonlawyer,
the director lacks the wherewithal to pursue an agenda independent of
the court or the professional knowledge to carry it out. Similarly, the
partnering DVSO—while organizationally independent of the court—
was hamstrung by its lack of independent legal knowledge and capacity
to effectively pressure the court on behalf of applicants through appeals

J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

June 2016]

FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS

6/19/2016 11:59 AM

1327

or other measures. The DVSO sunk financial resources into a program
that did not meet its objectives or its clients’ needs, and felt incapacitated
to challenge the program’s operation in a community with few resources.
In contrast, the NGO partner at Program A is not only
organizationally independent from the court, but as a legal aid provider
obviously possesses legal expertise. Nonetheless, staff members
referenced what the court wanted when restricting access to remedies for
applicants, seemingly without reference to a considered, independent
legal analysis. This might relate to organizational priorities as well as
workplace structure. The LAO has a reputation for not being interested
in family law, a viewpoint confirmed by attorneys on staff and the
program director. Reflecting the perspectives on family law held by some
poverty lawyers, discussed above, the LAO’s leadership was reportedly
more interested in other practice areas that they believed were more
130
relevant to social change goals. This likely limited the development of
goals and objectives for the self-help program, and the resources made
available to position it within a broader advocacy strategy. Indeed, while
both programs in this study identified some staff members as
“advocates,” staff and administrators were careful to distinguish this role
from traditional notions of advocacy. All emphasized that advocates at
the self-help program do not “take sides” or affirmatively advocate for
anyone. Rather they provide general information to litigants about the
legal process. Additionally, the LAO does not provide representation to
applicants at hearings at significant levels or on appeals, or engage in
other advocacy work aimed at systemic reform. Also, because of the way
“turf” is divided up in the county, there is no other legal aid organization
able or willing to assist. As a result, a large portion of the county is
without a reform-oriented legal services program. In the self-help
program, a lack of support from attorneys left staff members reliant on
judicial cues for how to advise applicants.
The courts may therefore have influenced both Program A and
Program B more than the other way around. Figure 1 illustrates this
dynamic. The relative influence of the court over both programs, and
their respective NGO partners, is reflected in the solid shape for the
court. Patterned shapes depict the more “permeable” nature of each selfhelp program (“SHP”), and the NGOs. Additionally, the isolation of
DVSO advocates within Programs A and B is depicted by the
encapsulation of a small diamond shape in the same pattern as the
DVSO, representing the DVSO staff members within each program.

130. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Similarly, each DVSO’s lack of influence over program policies and
131
practices is shown by their position outside the partnership.
Figure 1: System Analysis of Self-Help Partnerships

These findings show how the failure to provide culturally and legally
competent services can arise from multiple sources, including lack of
capacity, poorly navigated tradeoffs between helping more people and
the routinization of services, and a lack of interest in integrating self-help
into a larger advocacy or reform strategy. In some instances, NGO
partners might reconsider partnerships with court-affiliated self-help
programs that drain resources without effectuating advocacy goals.
However, better self-help services can also be achieved by applying
132
principles of social justice advocacy.
Although a full discussion of what this might look like is beyond the
scope of this Article, models for progressive approaches to self-help
exist, and provide accessible alternatives to railroading individuals
through bureaucratic services that disregard individual needs and perpetuate
133
stereotypes. Indeed, self-help presents opportunities for group work and
community education that are fundamental precepts of social justice

131. Although the DVSO associated with Program A is not a program partner, it is still connected
through its volunteers, who dedicate time to the program as well as to the DVSO.
132. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 Geo. J.
on Poverty L. & Pol’y 473, 510–26 (2015) (detailing the key features of social justice advocacy in
lawyering, social work, and lay victim advocacy).
133. Id. at 526–41 (laying out the foundations for a legal services program informed by social
justice advocacy principles).

J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

June 2016]

FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS

6/19/2016 11:59 AM

1329

134

advocacy. As a social justice practice, educating people about how to
approach the court involves exposing the reasons for conventional
narratives so that individuals can participate more fully in decisions
about how and when to tell their stories—including whether to depart
135
from convention in the telling. This process can also result in the
construction of multiple templates for narratives about domestic
violence, rather than just one, to better fit the diversity of circumstances
that abuse survivors present. Any mode for service delivery can succumb
to routinization and its attendant problems. Thus, a normative
commitment to social justice may be the most important starting point
for reconnecting services for survivors, such as self-help, to social change
goals aimed at empowering individuals and eliminating gender violence.
To the extent that it may not be clear to some providers how legal
assistance for unrepresented litigants fits into a social justice mission,
funding requirements can help incentivize a better balancing of priorities.
Applications for funding should be required to show the capacity of
NGO partners to maintain independence from the court, and for
culturally competent services. Independence of the court should include
both capacity for analysis of legal issues and strategies, and capacity for
systemic reform that benefits vulnerable litigants. In this regard,
collaborations between legal aid and lay advocacy organizations in which
both contribute expertise to the partnership should be encouraged. Lay
advocates bring needed expertise in domestic violence, and a broader
136
perspective to supportive services. Lawyers provide expertise necessary
to independently assess the legal scheme, related issues such as child
137
welfare reporting requirements, and other legal issues and strategies.
Proposals or agreements for self-help programs should explain how the
NGO partners will ensure their collaboration maximizes the benefits of
their respective expertise, and ensure both are involved in
138
decisionmaking and priority setting. Additionally, preference should be

134. Id. at 512 (“The component of education is at the center of social justice lawyering: education
of the lawyer, as well as the client or community.”). Such opportunities can be balanced with the
applicants’ desire for privacy by providing targeted one-on-one assistance at critical junctures—at
intake for example.
135. Id. at 511 (describing storytelling as a method for revealing the social construction of the
world, and thus essential to social justice advocacy).
136. See id. at 522–24 (describing the expertise lay advocates contribute to a social justice advocacy
program).
137. Id. at 521–22 (describing the expertise of lawyers); see also Colleen F. Shanahan et al.,
Representation in Context: Party Power and Lawyer Expertise 6 (Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (defining attorney expertise as: substantive, such as knowledge of the
rules of law; relational, such as understanding how to navigate among legal actors and settings; and
strategic, such as synthesizing substantive and relational knowledge to make informed choices for
clients).
138. MacDowell, supra note 132, at 536–38 (discussing the benefits of collaboration between lay
advocates and lawyers).
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given to programs that will connect self-help assistance to direct
advocacy services (lay and/or legal) and systemic reform activities. The
NGO partners should be required to explain how the self-help program
would coordinate with advocacy activities to maximize services to
individuals using the program and benefit the larger goal of eliminating
domestic violence. Independent program evaluation that critically
assesses services to make sure these goals are met is vitally important and
139
can also be incentivized through funding channels.
In sum, self-help is not inherently incompatible with empowerment
or structural reform goals. However, this study shows how self-help
programs for abuse survivors may shift the focus from victims to litigants
without eliminating foundational stereotypes about victims (and
perpetrators) or other barriers to the courts and to justice. By replacing
notions of neutrality with structures that support social justice advocacy,
self-help programs may become a creative part of the solution.

139. Id. at 539–40 (advocating for program evaluation that examines “whether the program’s
efforts reduce punitive practices, unwanted interventions, and the influence of bias, while increasing
judicial compliance with the law. [Such an approach] would also develop methods to examine whether
client-litigants are empowered to address the problems that brought them to the program.”). For a
detailed discussion and examples of the role clinical legal education can play in meeting needs for
empirical access to justice research, including program evaluation, see Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin,
The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 161–68.

